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Abstract.—Lethal management of Double-crested Cormorants (Phalocrocorax auritus) has been implemented in 
many areas of the United States. In this paper, the philosophical method of argument analysis is used to assess ethi-
cal premises underlying the proposition that Double-crested Cormorant populations should be culled to reduce 
pressures on wild fisheries in the Great Lakes region of the eastern USA. This influential argument has been used to 
justify the destruction of more than half a million Double-crested Cormorants and hundreds of thousands of their 
nests and eggs. Three versions of the argument are formulated and assessed. It is shown that each of the arguments 
presupposes some form of anthropocentrism, an ethical stance considered by many in the scholarly community 
to be philosophically untenable and ethically inappropriate. It is suggested, consequently, that the arguments ana-
lyzed do not constitute an ethically sound basis for lethal management of Double-crested Cormorants in the Great 
Lakes region of the eastern USA. Received 23 July 2017, accepted 19 September 2017.
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Competition is integral to ecology. Com-
munity development, for example, is largely 
driven by competitive dynamics between in-
dividuals (Tilman 2004), and competition 
is a primary driver of food web dynamics in 
ecosystems (Holt and Polis 1997). And yet, 
although competition is at times a biologi-
cal necessity, and perhaps an evolutionary 
imperative, humans (and other species) also 
demonstrate a parallel capacity for more co-
operative modes of social relation (Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2003; Penner et al. 2005). For 
example, it is common for humans to share 
goods and resources with other humans, and 
non-human beings as well, at times (e.g., by 
sharing food with pets). However, sharing is 
not always easy or intuitive in the context of 
human-wildlife relations, particularly when 
other species threaten or challenge spe-
cific human agendas. Such situations raise 
complex ethical questions about proper hu-
man conduct toward the environment, and 
particularly wildlife. Are humans obligated 
to share resources with members of other 
species, particularly when doing so requires 
some adjustment to established norms and 
objectives?
 Abstract ethical questions of this 
sort take on practical importance in the con-
text of natural resources and wildlife man-
agement. In this paper, we consider lethal 
management of Double-crested Cormorants 
(Phalacrocorax auritus; hereafter, cormo-
rants) in the Great Lakes region of the east-
ern USA. This issue exemplifies some of the 
ways in which ethical questions come to bear 
on management decisions. For example, 
how should conflict between cormorants 
and humans be handled? As highly con-
spicuous and efficient fishing birds, cormo-
rants have long been viewed as competitors 
whose feeding habits threaten valuable com-
mercial and recreational fishery resources 
(Wild 2012; Wires 2014). Large colonies of 
cormorants also tend to visibly alter the veg-
etation of their habitat in ways that might 
adversely affect other bird and wildlife spe-
cies, along with scenic or aesthetic qualities 
of the landscape enjoyed by humans (Wires 
2014). Although formally protected under 
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service 2009), in many 
States of the USA, cormorants have been 
legally killed under the 1998 Aquaculture 
Depredation Order and the 2003 Public 
Resource Depredation Order, which, un-
til recently, have permitted the “take” of 
cormorants perceived to damage environ-
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mental or economic resources that humans 
want or need (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
2003a). These regulations set an important 
precedent for the management of not only 
cormorants, but fish-eating birds as a group, 
since many fish-eating species interact with 
resources in ways similar to cormorants.
For years, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service has enacted extensive lethal man-
agement activities across the eastern USA, 
largely responding to the perception that 
cormorant fishing habits threaten human 
interests in wild fisheries (U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service 2014a; Wires 2014). Since 
the first depredation order was established 
in 1998, well over half a million cormorants 
and hundreds of thousands of nests and 
eggs have been destroyed (U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service 2014a). As of May 2016, fol-
lowing a legal suit filed by Public Employ-
ees for Environmental Responsibility (Case 
1:14-cv-01807-JBD), the U.S. Fish and Wild-
life Service was found to be in violation of 
the National Environmental Policy Act with 
its most recent renewals of the Aquaculture 
Depredation Order and the Public Resource 
Depredation Order (U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service 2014b). Both orders have since been 
suspended, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service was ordered to conduct a “new and 
legally adequate” environmental assessment 
or environmental impact statement to con-
sider multiple management alternatives.
As the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service initi-
ates this process, it is critical that the agency 
take not only relevant scientific, political, 
and socioeconomic factors into consider-
ation, but also ethical ones. Despite the mag-
nitude of lethal cormorant management 
in the eastern USA, there has to date been 
no critical assessment of its ethical appro-
priateness (Wires 2014). Fortunately, such 
challenging ethical issues can be addressed 
in a rigorous, systematic manner using es-
tablished methods of philosophical analysis. 
Lethal management of cormorants has been 
employed for certain reasons, which can be 
constructed formally as arguments. By explic-
itly formulating and analyzing arguments, 
unfounded assumptions, false information, 
and inappropriate moral precepts are laid 
open to rational critique. We use argument 
analysis to evaluate one highly influential 
argument underpinning past and ongoing 
proposals for lethal cormorant management 
in the Great Lakes region of the USA. The 
aims in this paper are twofold: 1) to high-
light some of the problematic claims under-
lying lethal cormorant management in this 
region; and 2) to demonstrate the value of 
argument analysis as a method to systemati-
cally reason through controversial issues in 
natural resources and wildlife management.
Methods
Argument analysis has only recently been applied 
to natural resources and related fields (Nelson and 
Vucetich 2009; Vucetich and Nelson 2017), but it is 
well established in philosophical tradition and traces its 
roots to Greek antiquity with the birth of formal logic 
(Jaquette 2006). In its most basic form, an argument 
can be formulated as a set of premises (P) that lead to a 
conclusion (C). For example:
P1. All cormorants are black birds.
P2. All black birds eat fish.
C. Therefore, all cormorants eat fish.
Once formulated, the argument can be assessed for 
soundness. A sound argument must meet two criteria. 
First, the premises must logically entail the conclusion 
of the argument. If an argument meets this first criteri-
on, it is valid but not necessarily sound. To be sound the 
argument must also meet the second criterion, namely 
that all of its premises are true. The argument above 
is valid (since, by deductive logic, if we accept both 
premises we must also accept the conclusion), but P2 is 
clearly untrue, so the argument is not sound. And yet, 
we know the conclusion is accurate. This highlights the 
important caveat that even if an argument is unsound, 
the position it supports is not necessarily wrong. A thor-
ough argument analysis will consider a full spectrum of 
arguments to assess whether a given position is rational-
ly justified by any of the arguments made in its defense.
The example above is a relatively simple descriptive 
argument. More commonly in natural resources and 
wildlife management, people advance normative argu-
ments (i.e., arguments that are prescriptive, rather than 
descriptive). Normative arguments must contain at least 
one normative premise to be valid. A normative premise 
might explicitly state how things “should” or “ought to” 
be, but it may take other forms as well (e.g., by asserting 
notions of good or bad, right or wrong, justice, or value). 
When stated in these latter forms, we might consider the 
premise not only normative but also distinctly ethical.
A set of exclusively descriptive premises does not 
logically entail a normative conclusion, since what “is” 
observed does not on its own suggest what “ought” to 
be (Hume 2000). For example, it is impossible to argue:
200 WaterBirds
P1. Cormorants are black birds. (descriptive)
C. Therefore, we should kill cormorants. (normative)
The argument requires an additional normative 
premise:
P1. Cormorants are black birds. (descriptive)
P2. We should kill all black birds. (normative)
C. Therefore, we should kill cormorants. (normative)
Now the chain of inference is valid, since the two 
premises necessarily entail the conclusion. However, 
we still must evaluate the premises for truth. Assessing 
the “truth” of normative premises can be more chal-
lenging than assessing the truth of descriptive premis-
es, which are often scientifically and empirically verifi-
able. We generally try to evaluate whether a normative 
premise is “appropriate” rather than true. Though 
sometimes complex and highly controversial, judg-
ments of appropriateness can in many cases be made 
simply by referring to common morality, or even com-
mon sense. For example, the unqualified assertion “we 
should kill all black birds” would be justifiable only on 
grounds of superstition or intolerance, neither gener-
ally accepted as a basis for a moral position, at least 
in contemporary Western society. Therefore, P2 can 
be considered inappropriate, rendering the argument 
unsound.
Prior to analysis, arguments must first be identi-
fied and selected, a process that can be carried out 
in different ways. For example, Jager et al. (2016) 
used relevant media coverage to identify and ana-
lyze arguments for and against management of Mute 
Swans (Cygnus olor) in Michigan, USA. For the pres-
ent analysis, we relied on a small group of colleagues 
with expertise and experience in cormorant manage-
ment in the USA. With these colleagues, we compiled 
a table of the most influential reasons people use to 
support or oppose lethal management of cormorants 
(Table 1). To conduct a thorough analysis, each rea-
son in Table 1 could be formulated and evaluated 
as a separate argument. Here, we analyze one set of 
arguments, which generally state that lethal manage-
ment should be used because cormorant populations 
threaten valuable goods and resources, including 
wild fisheries, aquaculture, and ecosystem health. 
Since space prevents us from analyzing arguments in 
each of these contexts, we focus on wild fisheries, a 
central and long-standing locus of conflict between 
humans and cormorants in the Great Lakes region of 
the USA (Wires 2014).
results
We identified three versions of the wild 
fisheries argument, each ethically distin-
guishable from the others in subtle but im-
portant ways. The first version can be formu-
lated as follows:
P1. Wildlife that impede humans from 
satisfying their preferences are nui-
sances.
P2. Cormorants impede humans from 
satisfying their preferences in wild 
fisheries.
C1. Therefore, cormorants are nuisances.
P3. To allow humans to satisfy their pref-
erences, wildlife nuisances should be 
controlled by whichever means are 
most practical and effective.
Table 1. Reasons for and against lethal management of Double-crested Cormorants in the Great Lakes region, USA. 
Reasons were developed by a small group of experts who specialize in the study of Double-crested Cormorants, 
and are based on their collective experience with lethal management of these birds in the USA.
Reasons for Lethal Management Reasons against Lethal Management
Lethal management of cormorants protects goods 
enjoyed by humans (wild fisheries, aquaculture, 
ecosystem health)
Lethal management of cormorants will have nega-
tive impacts on ecosystems
Cormorants are greedy or voracious Cormorants are living creatures, worthy of moral 
consideration
Cormorants are invasive or destructive Cormorants are a natural part of the ecosystem
Lethal management of cormorants imparts a sense 
of control over fish stock losses
Cormorants are not responsible for fish stock losses 
- it is unjust to blame them, and a distraction from 
the real issue
Cormorants are appropriate targets for hunting Lethal management of cormorants is ineffective
Cormorants exceed human tolerance levels (so-
cial, cultural, or wildlife carrying capacity)
Slippery slope: lethal management sets a precedent 
that risks undermining other environmental laws
Lethal management will not compromise popula-
tion viability
The outcome of lethal management is uncertain 
and runs contrary to the precautionary principle
Lethal management is the only way to handle hu-
man-wildlife conflict
There are other ways to resolve human-wildlife conflict
Lethal management is necessary to appease certain 
social sectors
There is no good reason to use lethal management
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P4. Lethal management is the most prac-
tical and effective means for control-
ling cormorants.
C2. Therefore, cormorants should be 
controlled by lethal management.
P1 and P3 situate this argument in a nar-
row anthropocentric, utilitarian worldview. 
Based on the metaphysical belief that hu-
mans are categorically distinct from and 
superior to all other types of beings, the 
narrow anthropocentric view presumes that 
nonhuman beings, including wildlife, are 
valuable only to the extent that they satisfy 
human preferences (Norton 1984; Goral-
nik and Nelson 2012). Following from this 
view, narrow anthropocentrism assumes hu-
mans are justified in using wildlife in which-
ever way maximizes human welfare. On this 
view, it is appropriate to sustain or promote 
wildlife populations that have some utility 
value for humans, but it is also appropriate 
to control or even eradicate wildlife popu-
lations that have no such utility value, par-
ticularly when they actively prevent humans 
from enjoying the utility value of other 
goods or resources.
Narrow anthropocentrism has been 
widely rejected as a basis for management, 
being linked to extractive and exploitative 
use of wildlife and natural resources (White 
1967; Callicott 1990; Norton 1992). It has 
also been critiqued philosophically for be-
ing predicated on flawed assumptions that 
only humans possess certain characteristics, 
such as sentience, consciousness, or rational-
ity, which are used as markers of human su-
periority over other types of beings (Routley 
and Routley 1979). With the recognition that 
some nonhuman beings possess these same 
characteristics (and some human beings do 
not possess these characteristics), environ-
mental ethicists argue that it is arbitrary and 
rationally inconsistent to elevate humans cat-
egorically above nonhumans, or at least those 
who possess the characteristics in question 
(Routley and Routley 1979). Others still have 
criticized the choice of characteristics them-
selves as human-biased, socially constructed, 
and rationally indefensible criteria for moral 
standing (Taylor 1981; Plumwood 1993).
Although there is wide recognition in 
the scholarly community that narrow an-
thropocentrism is environmentally damag-
ing, philosophically untenable, and ethically 
inappropriate, it remains influential as a 
normative basis for wildlife management, in-
cluding lethal management of cormorants in 
the eastern USA. People in the Lake Cham-
plain region of the USA, for example, have 
expressed preferences for less abundant cor-
morant populations, regarding the birds, at 
observed population levels, as pests (Kuent-
zel et al. 2012). These attitudes are associated 
with perceived competition between cormo-
rants and anglers, and also linked to support 
for lethal management activities (Kuentzel et 
al. 2012).
The second version of the wild fisher-
ies argument exemplifies a broader form 
of anthropocentrism than the first, by ac-
knowledging a spectrum of human benefits 
beyond purely economic or utility values 
(Norton 1984; Goralnik and Nelson 2012). 
This version of the argument can be formu-
lated as follows:
P1. Wild fisheries provide benefits for hu-
mans.
P2. Cormorant populations also provide 
benefits for humans.
P3. Cormorant predation compromises 
the benefits wild fisheries provide for 
humans.
P4. Wildlife management should sustain 
all the benefits that wildlife provide 
for humans.
P5. Using lethal management to control 
cormorant predation sustains the 
benefits that both wild fisheries and 
cormorant populations provide for 
humans.
C. Therefore, lethal management should 
be used to control cormorant preda-
tion.
The broad anthropocentric view, ad-
vanced decades ago by environmental 
ethicist Bryan Norton (Norton 1991), has 
become influential of late in the prevalent 
ecosystem services framework for manage-
ment and conservation, which expands the 
notion of a human “benefit” to include 
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indirect or intangible goods that are sup-
ported by ecosystem processes and func-
tions (Costanza et al. 2017). In many cases, 
lethal management of cormorants has been 
informed by a similarly expansive sense of 
human benefits. For example, the environ-
mental assessment conducted by the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Department in the state 
of Michigan, USA, notes, “Wildlife popula-
tions provide a range of social and econom-
ic benefits… related to consumptive and 
non-consumptive use” (U.S. Department 
of Agriculture 2011). With the understand-
ing that cormorants do have value for some 
people, even if their particular type of value 
(e.g., cultural or existence value) cannot 
be reduced to a utility or preference, lethal 
management has been framed as an effort 
to balance the multiple values of wildlife for 
humans.
As stated in P5, lethal management to 
control cormorant populations may pro-
tect the benefits humans derive from both 
fisheries and cormorants if we assume the 
particular types of values associated with cor-
morants would still be provided by less abun-
dant populations. If this is true, and if we 
accept the broad anthropocentric stance ad-
opted in P4, the conclusion here may be jus-
tified. However, this version of the argument 
neglects the possibility that the cormorants 
being culled may also have value in them-
selves. If broad anthropocentrism avoids 
some of the practical problems (i.e., exploi-
tation and resource degradation) linked to 
the narrower anthropocentric stance (White 
1967; Norton 1991), it still posits human 
beings and their interests as the measure 
of all value in the world. As such, it can be 
critiqued on the philosophical and ethical 
grounds of arbitrariness, inconsistency, and 
inappropriateness noted above.
Against anthropocentrism, many in the 
scholarly community have argued that wild-
life, either individually or collectively, also 
possess inherent value (i.e., value for their 
own sake) (Taylor 1981; Agar 2001; Smith 
2016). Inherent value, in turn, is used as a 
basis for the argument that wildlife ought to 
be granted direct moral standing, obligating 
humans, as moral agents, to view and treat 
them as more than instrumental means to 
human ends (Taylor 1981; Rolston 1988). If 
these arguments are sound, a claim like P4 
suggesting wildlife should be managed only 
for and as human benefits, without consider-
ing their inherent value, would be ethically 
inappropriate. This leads to a third version 
of the wild fisheries argument, which can be 
formulated as follows:
P1. Cormorant predation on commer-
cial/recreational fish stocks com-
petes with human interests, generat-
ing conflict between cormorants and 
humans.
P2. Conflict between cormorants and hu-
mans should be reduced.
P3. Lethal management will reduce cor-
morant predation on commercial/
recreational fish stocks.
P4. Reducing cormorant predation on 
commercial/recreational fish stocks 
will reduce conflict between cormo-
rants and humans.
C1. Therefore, lethal management will 
reduce conflict between cormorants 
and humans.
P5. Lethal management entails intention-
ally killing cormorants.
P6. As living beings with inherent value, 
cormorants should not be intention-
ally killed without justification.
P7. Reducing conflict between cormo-
rants and humans justifies intention-
ally killing cormorants.
C2. Therefore, cormorants should be in-
tentionally killed to reduce conflict 
between cormorants and humans.
Before addressing the ethical premises of 
this third version of the argument, we briefly 
comment on the empirical premises, since 
they also bear on the soundness of the argu-
ment.
The claim made in P1 (which also ap-
peared, in slightly different forms, in P2 of 
the first version and P3 of the second version 
of the argument) is contested. Wires (2014) 
summarizes a large body of research on the 
impacts of cormorant predation on high-
value fishery stocks. Most evidence indicates 
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that cormorants do not primarily feed on fish 
species that are valued by anglers and com-
mercial fishermen or fisherwomen (Diana et 
al. 2006; Dalton et al. 2009). But cormorants 
are also widely considered generalist and op-
portunistic feeders (Wires 2014), adapting 
to geographic and seasonal fluctuations in 
prey, which might sometimes include fish 
valued by anglers and commercial fishermen 
or fisherwomen (Lantry et al. 2002; Rudstam 
et al. 2004; Fielder 2008). Thus, we cannot at 
present say with certainty whether or under 
what circumstances P1 is true or not true. It is 
certainly true, however, that cormorant pre-
dation is perceived to compete with human 
interests, and this perceived competition 
has indeed contributed to conflict between 
cormorants and humans in the eastern USA 
(Kuentzel et al. 2012; Wires 2014). Proceed-
ing to P3, there is evidence associating lethal 
management of cormorants with recovery in 
valued fish populations (Fielder 2010; Schul-
tz et al. 2013; Johnson et al. 2015). However, 
these findings are context-specific, and the 
research has been critiqued for the pres-
ence of confounding variables and study de-
sign biases (Diana 2010; Schultz et al. 2013; 
Johnson et al. 2015). Therefore, the truth 
of P3 also remains unclear. The last empiri-
cal premise that merits commentary is P4 
(since P5 is a non-controversial statement of 
fact). In the growing body of work on hu-
man-wildlife conflict (Seoraj-Pillai and Pillay 
2017), researchers have found that conflict 
does not necessarily dissipate once dam-
ages caused by wildlife, or perceived to be 
caused by wildlife, have ceased (Dickman 
2010). Drivers of human conflicts with cor-
morants, and wildlife in general, are many 
and complex (Dickman 2010). Conflict 
with cormorants in the Great Lakes region 
of the USA, for example, is proximately re-
lated to perceived competition over wild 
fisheries, but there is also a long history of 
superstition around and intolerance toward 
cormorants, neither of which is necessarily 
based on cormorant predation habits per se 
(Wires 2014). Therefore, the initial conclu-
sion (C1) that reducing predation-related 
competition will also reduce conflict may 
not be supported.
Turning now to the ethical premises, P6 
marks the most obvious divergence from 
previous versions of the argument. P6 ex-
presses a claim about the inherent value of 
cormorants that can be found in both the 
Final Environmental Impact Statement and 
the Final Rule for the 2003 Public Resource 
Depredation Order (U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service 2003a, 2003b). The premise here ex-
presses a biocentric perspective attributing 
inherent value to cormorants as living be-
ings (Goralnik and Nelson 2012), but could 
also be expressed from a zoocentric perspec-
tive attributing inherent value to cormorants 
as sentient animals.
The important point to note is that, 
whether as sentient animals or as living be-
ings, cormorants are recognized as ends in 
themselves, whose value extends beyond any 
value they provide for humans. From this 
follows the reasonable and generally non-
controversial ethical claim that entities with 
inherent value should only be killed if there 
is good reason to do so.
P7 cites conflict reduction as justification 
for intentionally killing cormorants. Ethi-
cists call this sort of claim “consequentialist,” 
in the sense that it appeals to the outcomes, 
or consequences, of an act (in this case, le-
thal management) to judge whether the act 
is right or wrong (Sinnott-Armstrong 2015). 
In the context of the argument, for justifica-
tion P7 relies on P2 before it, which estab-
lished conflict reduction as a worthy out-
come. With broad consensus that resolution 
or at least mitigation of human-wildlife con-
flict is a desirable goal (Treves et al. 2009), P2 
can be considered appropriate in a general 
sense. However, even a worthy end may not 
justify any means used to achieve it (Nelson 
et al. 2016). As such, establishing conflict re-
duction as a worthy end, in P2, does not, on 
its own, justify the more specific, compara-
tive claim that its value as an end supersedes 
the inherent value of the cormorants sacri-
ficed in efforts to reduce conflict.
Justifying P7 requires us to weigh the rela-
tive benefits of conflict resolution against the 
costs, and particularly the costs in cormorant 
lives. Assessments of this sort, which seek to 
compare values measured on different scales 
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(if measurable at all), are challenging, and 
their accuracy is a matter of some debate 
(Spash 2000; Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010). 
But P7 can also be evaluated conceptually 
by more closely examining the meaning of 
“conflict,” as it is being used here. In the 
human-wildlife context, “conflict” has been 
defined in different ways, but most com-
monly refers to damages caused by wildlife 
to human goods or resources (Peterson et 
al. 2010). Conflict, in this sense, is defined 
specifically from the perspective of humans 
(i.e., it is anthropocentric). At first glance, 
this connotation of “anthropocentric” may 
appear to be non-problematic; indeed, to 
the extent that we can only live and experi-
ence from our own human perspective, it is 
impossible for us to be anything but anthro-
pocentric (Goralnik and Nelson 2012). How-
ever, conflict is not only being defined from 
the human perspective in this ontologically 
anthropocentric sense, but also relative to 
and, critically, in the service of human values 
and interests in an ethically anthropocentric 
sense (Goralnik and Nelson 2012). To un-
derstand why this is the case, consider for a 
moment how “conflict” would be defined if 
we were to adopt a cormorant’s perspective. 
As generalists, cormorants are relatively flex-
ible and can adapt to prey availability, or lack 
thereof, if and as it fluctuates with human 
fishing operations (Wires 2014). As such, for 
cormorants “conflict” is not directly related 
to resource limitations as it is for humans in 
the Great Lakes region of the USA. Instead, 
conflict, as a cormorant might view it, arises 
out of the hazing, egg oiling, nest disrup-
tion, and shooting that, until recently, have 
been widely enacted to control their popula-
tions. It is striking to notice that alleviating 
conflict, as viewed from a human perspec-
tive, actually causes and perpetuates conflict, 
as viewed from a cormorant perspective. It is 
also important to note that the benefits of le-
thal management accrue entirely to humans, 
while costs are born entirely by cormorants. 
Therefore, even were it demonstrated, in a 
quantitative sense, that the net benefits of le-
thal management and conflict resolution ex-
ceed net costs, the distribution of costs and 
benefits is overwhelmingly skewed to favor 
human interests. If cormorants were regard-
ed and valued not merely as means, but also 
as ends in themselves, their interests could 
not, in good conscience, be so completely 
overlooked.
As such, P6 either misinterprets the 
meaning and implications of “inherent val-
ue” or invokes it as a rhetorical tool to deflect 
criticism from certain social sectors. Either 
way, this analysis suggests P6 can best be ex-
plained as a spurious non-anthropocentric 
premise in an otherwise anthropocentric ar-
gument for lethal management.
disCussion
This analysis, which examined three 
slightly different arguments supporting cor-
morant management in the eastern USA, 
demonstrates that all three arguments are 
predicated on an anthropocentric ethical 
position, which has been broadly refuted on 
philosophical and, in some cases, practical 
grounds. We suggest lethal control of cormo-
rants, or any wildlife population, predicated 
on anthropocentric claims or propositions is 
not ethically appropriate and should not be 
accepted as a sound basis for ongoing lethal 
management activities.
It could be argued that we formulated 
these arguments specifically to represent 
an anthropocentric stance. There is indeed 
some discretion in the precise wording and 
structure of the arguments presented in this 
paper, and certainly we acknowledge that 
our own values informed the interpretation 
of the arguments presented herein. We do 
not support the extensive program of lethal 
management that has been enacted across 
the eastern USA for many years, in part be-
cause we feel it rests on infirm anthropocen-
tric ethical foundations. However, we also 
point to evidence in the extent and extrem-
ity of lethal management that suggests our 
representation of these arguments, and our 
claim that the inherent value of cormorants 
has not genuinely been taken into consider-
ation, are defensible.
For example, as ruled by the District 
of Columbia District Court in 2016 (Case 
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1:14-cv-01807-JBD), the U.S. Fish and Wild-
life Service has failed to take the requisite 
“hard look” at impacts of lethal manage-
ment on cormorants, as mandated under 
the National Environmental Policy Act (U.S. 
Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance 
2017). If managing agencies have neglected 
their legal imperative to seriously consider 
the interests of cormorants, it seems unlikely 
that they recognize a parallel moral impera-
tive to do the same. The magnitude of cor-
morant management across the eastern USA 
is also telling. Over 500,000 cormorants were 
legally killed between 1999 and 2012, as per-
mitted by Federal order (U.S. Fish and Wild-
life Service 2014a). Assuming yearly averages 
remained more or less constant from 2013-
2015, this figure now likely exceeds 600,000 
(U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 2014a), even 
without accounting for other methods of 
cormorant harassment and control, such 
as nest destruction and egg oiling. We can 
also consider how targets have been set for 
lethal management. At the national level, 
the Final Environmental Impact Statement 
for the 2003 Public Resource Depredation 
Order proposed that roughly 8% of the U.S. 
population of cormorants would be killed, 
approximately 160,000 individuals (U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service 2003b). These 
targets were calculated based on records of 
cormorant depredation permits issued his-
torically, prior to the Public Resource Depre-
dation Order (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
2003b). Although this target certainly re-
flects public perceptions of cormorant pre-
dation and its effects on fishery stocks, which 
may or may not be accurate, it is not clearly 
based on scientifically informed estimates of 
the number of cormorants that would actu-
ally need to be removed to achieve recovery 
objectives for fisheries. Targets defined at 
the State level are also revealing. The envi-
ronmental assessment for cormorant man-
agement in the State of Michigan, USA, for 
example, dictates that a minimum of 5,000 
breeding pairs of cormorants should be 
maintained statewide, a figure calculated to 
ensure overall cormorant population viabili-
ty, and that no more than 15,500 cormorants 
may be killed in a given year (U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture 2011). Management tar-
gets, in other words, prescribe the maximum 
number of cormorants that can be killed, 
rather than the minimum number that must 
be killed, to achieve defined fisheries objec-
tives. This would be unfathomable as a rubric 
for governance of human societies or miti-
gation of inter-human conflicts. We suggest 
the calculation of management targets, and 
the thought processes underpinning them, 
would be radically different if the inherent 
value of cormorants was truly recognized.
Cormorants are currently experiencing a 
population resurgence bringing them close 
to historic abundances (Wires and Cuthbert 
2006), and could probably remain viable 
even at lower local and national population 
levels. Thus, the persistence of the species is 
not immediately at stake in deciding wheth-
er or not to continue lethal management. 
We suggest the more pressing issue is wheth-
er, in killing cormorants to eradicate com-
petition (or perceived competition) with hu-
mans, we are appropriately sharing common 
resources. Just as humans, individually and 
as societies, decide when and how to share 
with other humans, so too must we decide 
when and how we are obligated to share with 
non-human entities, including cormorants. 
There are unfortunately no simple rules to 
guide such challenging moral decisions, and 
many questions remain to be explored as we 
consider what it means (ecologically, social-
ly, and philosophically) for humans to share 
the earth’s resources with other life forms. 
For now, the more basic point we hope to 
emphasize is that the ability, and at times 
imperative, to share should not be restricted 
by default to inter-human relations. Instead, 
perhaps we ought to begin with the assump-
tion that we are morally obligated to share 
with non-humans, like cormorants, and that 
therefore we should share with non-humans 
unless there is a sound reason not to do so.
We focused primarily on only one set of 
arguments here, but the reasons listed in Ta-
ble 1 raise other interesting and important 
ethical questions as well. Examples include 
how to appropriately balance the wellbeing 
of individual entities with the good of the 
collective ecosystem (Vucetich and Nelson 
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2007), and to what extent humans should re-
spect or uphold the “naturalness” of ecologi-
cal systems (Anderson 1991). Particularly, 
as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service begins 
to develop and assess management alterna-
tives, we recommend argument analysis as a 
way to structure thorough assessment of not 
only the scientific but also the ethical under-
pinnings and implications of different pro-
posals. Having analyzed only one argument 
in this paper, we cannot rule out the possibil-
ity that lethal cormorant management in the 
eastern USA may be supported by a different 
argument or set of arguments. However, if 
ongoing proposals for lethal management 
are in fact being supported solely or primar-
ily by the arguments examined in this paper, 
we suggest there is good reason for the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service to seriously recon-
sider reinstating any broad scale program 
of lethal cormorant management unless or 
until it is justified by an alternative line of 
reasoning that is both scientifically and ethi-
cally sound.
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